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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION
There are seven principal forms of credit control in the field of Federal 
1Reserve policy:
Tradition against borrowing
Discount rate
Open-raarket operations
Direct dealing with individual banks
Publicity
Changes in reserve requirements
Changes in margins on loans to carry securities
Federal Reserve Policy is a major determinant of action taken by commer­
cial banks regarding adjustments to their reserve position, changes in loan 
policy, the prevailing interest paid and charged, the make-up of their asset 
portfolio and so on. Although all seven controls have effects in varying 
degrees on member bank borrowing, on3^ the tradition against borrowing and 
the Federal Reserve discount rate are discussed at any great length here. 
Recent changes have increased the reserve requirements of member banks and 
have tightened the money market even more and might to some extent affect the 
borrowing habits of member banks. Usually the changes in reserve requirements 
have been so gradual as to occasion little measurable effect on member bank 
borrowing, although indirectly they must add to the pressure on those who must 
decide what stand to take regarding borrowing from the Federal Reserve.
%. Randlolph Burgess, The Reserve Banks and the Money Market. Revised, 
New York: Harper & Brothers, 19^> p. 231.
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It is the intent of this paper to analyze to some extent the practices 
of member banks of the Federal Reserve System regarding their utilization of 
Federal Reserve Bank credit, the techniques involved in borrowing, the tradi­
tion regarding borrowing, the effects of the prevailing financial atmosphere 
and other associated relevancies.
Rules governing borrowing from the Federal Reserve banks are given in 
the body of Regulation A! of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System. This paper will not reiterate Regulation A but will, instead, discuss 
the history of member bank borrowing; it will attempt to explain why banks 
borrow, to explain the present discount policy and eligibility requirements, 
and to make some recommendations for future action and policy in this area.
To borrow from the Federal Reserve Banks, a member bank must pledge 
certain collateral defined by the Board of Governors to be "eligible for dis­
count" and pays interest on that loan at the prevailing Federal Reserve discount 
rate.
There have been two theories advanced which attempt to explain why banks
2borrow: the "profit" theory and the "need" theory.
The basis of the "profit" theory is that banks will borrow only when it 
is profitable to do so. When the open-market rate on short-term government 
securities is above the discount rate, a bank with a reserve deficiency will 
tend to keep the securities and borrow from the Federal Reserve. The profit 
comes from retaining higher yielding securities while borrowing is relatively 
cheap.
2G. Walter Woodworth, The Money Market and Monetary Management. New York: 
Harper & Row, 1965, p. 243.
The "need" theory is derived from a line of reasoning which says that 
banks won’t borrow unless they have to arxi even then will repay the loan as 
soon as they’re able. With this theory the discount rate involved is irrele- 
vent; and the banks tend to borrow and pay back quickly regardless of the 
rate they must pay.
The need theory is further supported by a strong tradition against bor­
rowing which probably dates back to the early years of this country; it is 
similar to the taboo years ago against an individual incurring personal debt. 
The similarity stops there since in more recent years the typical individual 
in this country has almost eagerly accepted personal debt to obtain his more 
fanciful desires. Banking on the other hand has been more conservative 
towards changing tradition, and indeed still retains a strong sentiment against 
borrowing. An examination of financial statements of banks at year-end should 
indicate that banks generally prefer not to disclose major indebtedness to 
the public; and probably rid themselves of these debts prior to statement
3time. This might suggest that bankers themselves are not adverse to bor­
rowing but that they don’t want their indebtedness to become public knowledge.
^Chart 4, Average Monthly Borrowings of Member Banks, supports this 
theory in that the lowest months for borrowing by member banks as indicated in 
1965 was November through January, the typical statement time.
Chapter Two 
HISTORICAL SKETCH OF BORROVJING
In the early years after the Federal Reserve Act the mode of thinking 
was about the commercial banking theory; that is, that Idie only safe way to 
lend money was to make self-liquidating loans, A self-liquidating loan is 
one Tdiich generates funds to pay the loan through the use made of the money 
borrowed. Money loaned to a farmer to put in a crop is a self-liquidating 
loan, since payment will come only after the crop is harvested.
Chart 1 indicates that, for the first couple of years, borrowing from 
the Federal Reserve was light. This was partly due to unfamiliarity on the 
part of the banks with the discount mechanism, but more largely due to lack 
of need for borrowing.
To overcome some of the difficulties associated with discounting eligible 
paper, the Federal Reserve Act was revised in 1916 to permit the use of 
government securities as collateral.
Preferential discount rates were introduced during World War I to banks 
using Government securities as collateral for loans; this lead to a marked 
increase in reserve borrowings and made U, S. securities a more popular item, 
too. As indicated in Chart 1, total discounts and advances outstanding 
reached nearly 3 billion dollars by the end of 1920. Although this total 
declined sharply by 1922, discounts and advances remained rather substantial 
through the early years of the depression. Most banks either ran low on 
eligible collateral in the early 30 *s or had had such unhappy experiences 
associated with borrowing that a substantial part of the borrowing had subsided
by 1933.
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Investments in U. S, Government sécurités by commercial banks took their
first major upswing towards "üie end of World War 1 as indicated in Chart 6.
With the war financing virtually complete, several Federal Reserve
banks raised the discount rate by steps to a maximum of 7 percent in an
hattempt to curb the growing credit expansion. When the march of inflation 
continued. Federal Reserve authorities took more direct action by warning 
individual member banks against further credit expansion and trying to 
encourage them to reduce or liquidate their borrowings, ^Prices broke sharply 
in the spring of 1920, but discounting continued at high levels through 1920, 
and the Federal Reserve continued to apply direct pressure into 1921 to 
reduce borrowings,”'̂
One form of direct pressure tried by some Federal Reserve districts was 
progressive interest rates; once a member bank’s borrowings exceeded a cer­
tain "basic line" — vdiich was determined individually for each bank— interest 
rates rose sharply for any additional borrowing. Progressive interest rates 
were repealed vhen the Reserve Act was revised in 1923*^
Discounts declined as open market operations became more widely under­
stood and the purchase and sale of securities assumed a major portion of the 
manipulation of bank reserves by 1930.
Credit policy in 1924 was directed toward international cooperation in 
re-establishing exchange stability. There was a rather widespread idea
^Chart 3 indicates that the Federal Reserve discount rate reached an all- 
time high of 7 percent in mid-1920 and it remained at that rate until early 1921,
^George W, McKinney, Jr., The Federal Reserve Discount Window. New Bruns­
wick, New Jersey; Rutgers University Press, I960, p, 14,
^Ibid,, p, 16,
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during this period that discounting different types of paper would have 
different effects; it was thought that discounting acceptances would achieve 
the desired results most’' satisfactorily and acceptances were therefore given 
a preferred rate. The only consequence of that action was that the majority 
of the discounted paper was acceptances.
In 1929 an attempt was made to control the type of paper discounted at 
the Federal Reserve banks.
The Great Depression showed the fallacy of the commercial loan theoiy.
As people rushed to withdraw their deposits and consumers and businesses cut 
back their spending, the economy came to a halt. Businesses who normally 
would have sold their inventories, found they had stores on hand that they 
couldn't get rid of, or could sell only at substantial losses. These self- 
liquidating loans lacked liquidity at the very time they were supposed to be 
liquid to keep the economy moving.
Banks became short of eligible collateral and couldn't borrow from the 
Federal Reserve. Consequently many banks were forced to close their doors 
due to lack of liquidity; these banks often times had perfectly sound assets 
on the books and many later paid off 100 cents on the dollar despite the 
adverse conditions which forced them to liquidate.
As the quality of eligible paper deteriorated, all Federal Reserve banks 
except San Francisco began requiring excess collateral. This requirement 
intensified the poor liquidity of the members since it tied up assets vhich 
might have been used to secure other forms of borrowing to meet the demands 
of depositors.
In 1932, section 10 (b) was added to the Federal Reserve Act and provided 
that the Reserve banks could lend to members on notes secured "to the satisfaction"
9
of the Reserve bank but at a rate 1 percent above the rate on loans secured
7with government securities or by eligible paper. Furthermore all eligible 
paper had to be exhausted. The banking act of 1935 made section 10 (b) 
permanent but revised it so that all eligible paper need not be exhausted 
before borrowing under 10 (b) and changed the rate differential from 1 percent 
to 1/2 percent.
During World War II, the Federal Reserve was committed to provide the 
Government vdth low-cost sources of funds. The war was financed by enough 
Federal Reserve credit to enable the Government to borrow more than 200
o
billion dollars. The Federal Reserve Board stood reac^ to buy Ü. S. Govern­
ment securities at or above par— at a 2 1/2 percent interest rate on long-term
9bonds and lower rates on shorter term issues. This meant that the Govern­
ment securities held by member banks was as liquid as cash reserves, since 
they could be converted to cash at or above par at any time.
During this period the discount rate was set at a nominal 1 percent and
a preferential l/2 percent was granted to discounts secured with Government 
10securities. Banks became quite willing to purchase Government sécurités 
because of their liquidity.
After the war the prevailing inflexible monetary policy was becoming a 
troublesome problem. During World War II, yields and prices of Treasury 
securities had been stabilized in a situation in which investors had few or 
no alternative outlets for their money. Since post-war business was booming
7Ibid., p. 19.
%oard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. January, 19^, p. 16.
9lbld.
lOThe discount rate charged by the Federal Reserve is displayed in graphic 
form in Chart 3.
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and investment opportunities were widespread, pegging Government securities 
prices and yields not only prevented the Federal Reserve Board from using its 
power to limit inflation, but became an inflationary force itself.
At the same time the Treasury was pressing for stabilized interest rates 
to maintain a ready market for Government securities. The situation was fin­
ally resolved in the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord of 1951 which permitted 
the Federal Reserve to pursue a flexible monetary and credit poliçy as needed 
to influence appropriately the general economic situation.
Since 1951, the Federal Reserve System has followed a fairly vigorous 
and flexible policy concerning its use of the discount rate as a credit control 
mechanism.
n
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Chapter Three 
VJHY BANKS BORROW
The discount rate is a credit control mechanism because banks tend to 
borrow more when the rate is high and borrow less when the rate is low. This 
is the case because, in the banking system as a whole, the general economic 
conditions which invite a hike in the discount rate are the same conditions 
which lead banks to borrow. That is, in boom times there is a great demand 
for credit by the public and banks often must borrow to meet that demand and 
still maintain their reserve position; to curb inflation in these boom times, 
the Federal Reserve might raise the discount rate. Later when business activ­
ity drops off and the demand for money is not so great, banks are no longer 
under as great a pressure to borrow. If this falling off of activity persists 
the Federal Reserve might take appropriate steps to halt the decline and, 
among other things, lower the discount rate.
In keeping >dth the ’’need’* theory of borrowing, banks are most concerned 
with the relative costs of borrowing from the Federal Reserve as compared with 
the costs of alternative sources of funds. When adjustments to their reserve 
position are necessary to maintain the legally required reserve, the absolute 
cost of obtaining the funds is immaterial. Examples of alternative funds 
available to banks are; the sale of Government secuidties and the purchase of 
Federal funds. A bank needing funds is more apt to sell securities if the 
rate of return on them is below the discount rate; likewise Federal funds 
would be an attractive source wlien the Federal funds rate is low.
14
To illustrate that profit is not the dominant factor influencing borrow­
ing by member banks, one need only look at the differentials between the diŝ ' 
count rate and other applicable interest rates in the economy. The very fact 
that there is a differential indicates that profit is not the dominant factor 
influencing borrowing; the profit motive would attract money towards and away 
from the market in just the right proportions to eliminate the rate differential.
Bankers generally feel a need to supply a certain amount of credit to the 
banking public in good times and bad; in tight money times a banker might 
have to borrow. To a great extent the level of borrowing by member banks is 
a reflection of conditions which have had an effect on the reserve position 
of the borrowing banks. Conditions which might cause a drain on reserves and 
a subsequent reason to borrow are; excessive withdrawals of demand deposits 
or substantial loan increases. These demands for funds often take precedence 
over short-run profit motives; even a banker feeling no special compulsion 
to supply credit to his community in tight money times must meet all legiti­
mate withdrawals of demand deposits.
Because member banks borrow in response to drains on funds and because
of their reluctance to remain in debt for extended periods, the volume of
borrowing at any one time "constitutes oneof the most important single factors
11in money rate fluctuations ..."
It has not been intended to purport that cost is not significant to a 
banker •vdio must somehow acquire more funds; it is. vVhat has been intended 
is to suggest that the banker T-dll seek that source of funds which will, in
l^George N. Halm, Economics of Money and Banking, Homewood, Illinois; 
Richard D. Irwin, 1956, p. 119•
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the long run, be most beneficial, whether that source is borrowing from the 
Federal Reserve, borrowing from some other source or disposing of some assets. 
Most bankers do not like to remain in debt for extended periods and the longer 
they remain in debt the more determined are their efforts to rearrange their 
asset structure to fit their changing needs.
The seasonal volume and timing of borrowing of the banking system as a 
whole does not necessarily coincide to the needs of an individual bank. The 
over-all pattern of business activity is generally stronger in the fall with 
a peak at Thanksgiving and Christmas; it then slacks off until midyear except 
for the Easter season.
In an agricultural community, however, a banks deposits will increase 
during harvest reaching a peak at about Thanksgiving and then slowly decreases 
as the community pays out for living expenses. Then as planting time nears, 
the banks will increase their loans to meet the seasonal demand for money for 
the crop,
VJhen demand deposits are up in November and December the demand for 
credit by bank customers is also low. During this period, banks generally 
have excess reserves and as indicated by Chart 4, bank borrowing is at its 
lowest. Likewise, as bank deposits decline in spring and early summer, the 
demand for credit by customers increases and bank borrowing increases also.
As indicated by Chart 4, again, bank borrowing peaks out in May or June,
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Chapter Four 
■TRADITION AGAINST BORROWING
One of the more interesting facts associated -with member bank borrow­
ing from the Federal Reserve is the incidence with which banks borrow; some 
banks just do not borrow at all; others borrow in varying degrees ranging 
from seldom to regularly to heavily. Some banks borrow so regularly and 
heavily that the Federal Reserve sometimes finds it necessary to take direct 
action with the bank in question to discourage its continuous use of the 
discount facilities.
In the United States it has always been traditional banking practice 
to avoid indebtedness for extended periods. Much of the Federal Reserve's 
discount policy is predicated on this tradition and a constant pressure is 
placed on those indebted banks to reduce or eliminate their borrowing. At 
the same time banks tend to reduce their debt regardless of the discount 
rate, by calling loans, selling securities or not renewing loans,
"The discount mechanism, while supplying reserve funds tempor­
arily, tends to discourage undue expansion of bank credit. While 
banks are in debt, they are under pressure to repay and hence are 
likely to be conservative in expanding their own loans. Even when 
the total borrowing of all member banks is constant, a changing 
group of individual banks will be borrowing and will be feeling 
the need to restrict credit in order to adjust reserves. The 
restrictive influence of this pressure spreads beyond individual 
requests for bank credit and affects the attitudes of businesses 
and consumers throughout the community.
^^Board of Governors on the Federal Reserve System, Thirty-Ninth Annual 
Report Covering Operations for the Year 1952, Washington, 1953> p* 5*
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Borrowing by banks under normal conditions came to be considered almost
13synonomous with an overextended position.
Apparently the tradition against borrowing was a reality in the United
States before the establishment of the Federal Reserve System. As Burgess
phrased it ” . . .in the old days the bank which borrowed largely and contin-
14uously from its correspondents was looked upon with suspicion . . . ”
Ibis tradition against borrowing was substantiated during the early days 
of the Federal Reserve System. In 1920 and 1921 when the Federal Reserve first 
really applied a restrictive policy and increased the discount rate to as much 
as 7 percent, many banks were heavily in debt to the Federal Reserve banks.
For a few months during this period, some of the Federal Reserve banks even 
applied a progressive rate structure against those banks idio were the heaviest 
borrowers, thereby throwing an even heavier burden on those banks. Borrowing 
was discouraged.
Marçr banks, during the depression, in trying to meet the demand for with­
drawals, esdiausted their borrowing potential and were forced to close their 
doors because of lack of liquidity. Most of these banks had good solid assets 
but weren’t able to liquidate them fast enough to meet the demand and had to 
close their doors. These same banks in many cases later paid off all cus­
tomers 100 cents on the dollar after their assets were liquidated. In the 
meantime, however, the unpleasant experience associated with borrowing was
l^Lester V. Chandler, The Economics of Money and Banking. Revised edition. 
New York; Harper and Brothers, 1953, p* 323*
Randolph Burgess, The Reserve Banks and the Money Market* Revised, 
New York; Harper and Brothers, 19^, p. 219.
19
so unfortunate that by 193^ the tradition against borrowing could almost be 
described as a phobia,
With such a strong tradition built up against borrowing, banks made 
less and less use of the discount mechanism; as time went by the disuse made 
the traditional almost a forgotten part of the past. Of idiat possible signifi­
cance is a tradition against borrowing vihen the only occasion for borrowing 
is in nominal amounts for pure convenience and when the borrowing bank is in 
a position to repay the loan at any time with little or no inconvenience ?
^%cKinney, Op. Cit.. p. 41.
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Chapter Five 
ALTERNATE SOURCES OF FUNDS
Many banks consider the discount mechanism of the federal reserve to be 
a last resort to obtain needed funds, and, instead rely on other sources of 
funds as much as possible. In recent years, the same pressures tdiich have 
led member banks to become more familiar with the discount mechanism have 
also caused them to become more familiar with alternative sources of funds.
One of the most interesting borrowing techniques to develop in recent
16years has been the Federal Funds Market.
Although called a "purchase" or "sale" of Federal funds, the transaction 
is in effect a loan of funds immediately available at the Federal Reserve 
Bank. Typically, it is an overnight loan (except for holidays and weekends). 
Therefore it is best suited to large banks which try to keep their funds fully 
invested and adjust their reserve position daily. The lending bank advances 
funds "sold" by instructing the Federal Reserve Bank to transfer them to the 
borrowing bank’s reserve account for immediate credit. The borrowing bank 
makes the repayment by effecting a transfer to the reserve account of the 
selling bank on the next business day. Generally these are telephone transfers 
confirmed in writing.
Federal funds are sold at rates which can fluctuate very rapidly as 
supply and demand factors change; the rate shows wide savings in a single 
day. However the discount rate sets a fairly effective ceiling on the Federal
l^oodworth. On. Cit.. p. 53-65.
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Funds rate, and as the rate approaches that level it became more a question
of availability of Federal funds than a question of price.
Federal Funds are generally sold in blocks of $1 million or more; but
in the case of small banks, transactions may be half or a quarter of this 
17sum. This size limitation (together with the very short-term nature of the 
transaction) means only the large banks can actively participate in the Fed­
eral Funds market.
This has probably been one of the factors which led to the establishment 
of the market in repurchase of Governments (and municipals) because small 
banks also need a source of short-term funds and a short-term outlet for 
excess funds. Here again the terra "sale" and "repurchase" are used in place 
of "lending" and "borrowing"; however, the terras mean exactly the opposite 
of what they mean in Federal Funds transactions. The borrowing bank will 
"sell" Government securities to the lending bank under an agreement to 
"repurchase" them at a stated time and price. There is no risk of price 
fluctuations since the purchase and sale are at prices stipulated at the 
time of the original transaction and are not necessarily closely tied to 
market prices.
23
Chapter Six 
ELIGIBLE PAPER
A bank may have occasion to utilize collateral other than Government 
securities and many times must determine if the other collateral is "eligible 
paper" as defined in section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act. Eligible paper 
is generally; (l) commercial paper, (2) of short maturity and (3) is 
non-speculative in nature.
Commercial paper consists of notes issued by businesses and is "created 
in the process of financing the flow of commodities in production and trade 
(and) arises out of loans that are ordinarily liquidated by the borrower 
with funds received in the natural course of events from the sale of goods 
underlying the transaction.
It was thought, in the early days of the Federal Reserve System that 
loans of this self-liquidating variety should be encouraged; these self- 
liquidating loans were thought to be automatic credit and economic stabilizers. 
Commercial paper was supposed to end bank failures.
Commercial paper is no longer thought to be a guarantee against failure.
A lesson learned in the 30*s was that many businesses were unable to repay 
loans of this self-liquidating variety since the commodity representing the 
loan was sold often at a loss or not at all. Businesses were unable to pay 
back their loans because they couldn't sell their merchandise.
l&Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. Washington D. C., Vol. l6, No. 7, July, 1930, p. 401.
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It is realized that a bank imist, within the limits of its resources, 
meet all legitimate demands for commercial loans if it is to perform its 
basic function to the community; and bankers are normally happy to make 
sound loans of this type. However, a bank which makes only commercial 
(self-liquidating) loans could find itself unable to collect on those loans 
in hard times such as experienced during the depression.
Eligible paper was conceived at a time when redis counting by member 
banks was expected to be the main source of borrowed funds for commercial 
banks. The discount function was to serve as a cushion to protect the 
individual bank against short-term or unusual pressures. An undesirable and 
unnecessary element of inflexibility is introduced if the Federal Reserve 
Bank were to accept long-term paper as collateral. No useful purpose would 
be served by rediscounting paper of long maturity. Therefore, short-term 
paper was made a requirement for paper to be eligible.
The function of the central bank as a lender of last resort requires 
that it be willing and able during times of crisis to create the liquidity 
needed by the banking system. The requirement that only short-term paper 
be used to secure advances does not show the same logic that it does in the 
case of rediscounts. Advances are notes with their own maturity and the 
maturity of the collateral should be of no consequence. If the short-term 
requirement restricts the Federal Reserve's ability to lend on advances, 
then the Federal Reserve cannot provide the necessary liquidity in time of 
crisis.
It has been said that eligible paper must represent non-speculative 
ventures. The paper used to secure the loan must be of a non-speculative
25
nature, but the use of the proceeds of the loan for speculative purposes 
can be controlled only by restricting the total amount of borrowing by a 
member bank.
One of the acts recognized early by the Federal Reserve System was that
the use of borrowed funds does not depend on the nature of the collateral
used in obtaining them. Paper offered may disclose the purpose for idiich
the loan evidenced by that paper was made, but it does not disclose idiat use
19is to be made of the proceeds of the rediscount,  ̂ A farmer's note may be 
offered for rediscount by a member bank idien in fact the need for rediscounting 
has arisen because of extensions of credit by the member bank for speculative 
use. Commercial banks may make speculative extensions of credit as easily 
idiile borrowing on ninety-day commercial paper as lAile borrowir^ on paper 
secured by stocks. The nature of the collateral used is largely irrelevant.
l^Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1923 Annual Report. 
Washington D. C., p. 35«
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Chapter Seven 
HOW BAMS BORROW
From the inception of the Federal Reserve System until September, 1916, 
the only avenue available to banks for borrowing from the Federal Reserve was 
through the discount mechanism. At that time the provisions of the Federal 
Reserve Act were amended to permit the use of advances secured by eligible 
paper and Government securities; maturity was not to exceed 15 days.
Advances are basically a promissoiy note issued by the bank and secured 
by notes of the bank’s customers. Advances are normally in round figures 
and can be secured by notes of varying maturities. A customer need never 
know that his note was used to secure a loan (advance) for the bank.
Because of the greater convenience involved in borrowing on advances 
rather than on rediscounts, member bank borrowing on advances increased
rapidly. Since the mid-1930’s there has been practically no use of
20rediscounts.
During the first two decades of the Federal Reserve System most bankers 
kept a close inventory on the amount of eligible paper they held; this would 
insure ample securities in the event they wanted to borrow. Frequently, a 
bank’s loan policy was aimed at maintaining some minimum relation between the 
amount of eligible paper held and total loans outstanding. When borrowing 
declined in the 1930’s, however, the concept of eligible paper fell by the 
way for the most part.
20George W. McKinney, Jr. The Federal Reserve Discount Window Adminis­
tration in the Fifth District. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, 19̂ 0, p. 56*
27
As a result, ■when increased pressures to borrowing developed again in 
the early 1950*s, banks found themselves generally unfamiliar with the tech­
niques of borrowing from the Federal Reserve, and completely unfamiliar wi'th 
both the concepts underlying and the techniques of handling eligible paper.
But Government securities can also be used to secure advances and Governments 
were in ample supply; therefore the lack of familiarity with eligible paper 
had not really hauç)ered most banks ability to borrow from 'the Federal Reserve, 
Government securities have now almost supplanted o'ther eligible paper as 
collateral and has been found more convenient for several reasons; it is in 
large round denominations, it is readily available, and readily accepted as 
collateral.
The steps necessary to borrow from the Federal Reserve have been sim­
plified. The borro'wing bank sends only their executed note and the application 
form supplied by the Federal Reserve Bank. No covering letter or further 
ê qplanation is required. The application form provides space for a descrip­
tion of the collateral and where it may be found. The note is dated as of 
the day it arrives at the Federal Reserve Bank and credit is given the borrowing 
bank on that same day, completing all necessary action on the part of the 
borrowing bank. When "the no'te matures, the Federal Reserve Bank simply charges 
the borro-wing bank's account for the amount of the note and it is repaid.
If banks must borrow quite unexpectedly they can arrange for 'the loan 
by telephoning the Federal Reserve Bank stating amount and maturity desired 
along with a description of the collateral; then "bhe telephone conversation 
is confirmed by mailing in the required note and application. In this case 
the borrowing bank is credited with the proceeds of the loan on “the day of 
the call and a dummy note is filed pending receipt of the executed note from 
the borrowing bank.
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Most member banks keep a portion of their Government securities in 
safe-keeping at the Federal Reserve Bank* Others maintain their securities 
in their correspondent bank in Mew York and send the trust receipts, which 
represent the securities, to the Federal Reserve Bank* In either case the 
Federal Reserve Bank has physical control of the securities or trust receipts 
representing them; the Government securities are therefore readily available 
at the Federal Reserve Bank as collateral for member bank borrowing*
Procedures used in handling advances secured by eligible paper are simi­
lar to, but more complicated than, procedures used in handling advances 
secured by Government securities* The procedure becomes more complicated 
because the borrowing bank is required to certify that the paper offered as
collateral is in fact eligible paper as described in section 13 of the Fed- 
21eral Reserve Act*
A further complication for a bank securing an advance with eligible 
paper is that the bank must furnish current data on specified assets and 
liabilities* This additional requirement is made because it is generally 
considered to be much easier to secure an advance with Government securities; 
therefore a bank d̂iich is trying to secure a loan with eligible paper probably 
doesn't have any unpledged Government securities and is most likely already 
much in debt* The additional requirement gives the Federal Reserve Bank more 
information to analyze*
Furthermore, a bank borrowing on eligible paper must endorse that paper 
thereby making it obvious to the banks' customers that their notes were used 
to secure a loan for the bank* It is not really known just what customers'
Zlsiigible paper as defined by the Federal Reserve Act is discussed 
more fully in Chapter Six of this paper*
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reactions would be to this but most bankers probably do not consider the 
risk worth the chance to find out.
As indicated in Chart 6, bankers have generally reduced holdings of the 
United States Government securities since 19̂ 5* Althou^ this has not been 
a drastic decline it does represent some 20 billion dollars. United States 
Government securities held by commercial banks have declined despite an 
increase in the gross national debt as indicated in Chart ?. Commercial 
banks have reduced their holdings of Government securities in order to 
acquire funds to meet heavy loan demands. The interesting part of this 
trend, as it relates to member bank borrowing, is that it has sharply reduced 
the supply of United States Government securities ^ich could serve as collate:z . 
eral.
Chart 8 shows that since 19^7 holdings of public funds have been increas­
ing. Not all public funds require the deposits of securities as collateral, 
but a substantial portion of public funds do tie up some of the banks* 
holdings of securities. Governments cannot be used for collateral to borrow­
ings while they are pledged as security to public funds. Mean'sdiile the 
increase in business activity and in the amount of business done by banks 
has augmented their potential need to borrow. During much of this period a 
tight money market has brought additional pressure.
Over the past two decades, the member banks* holdings of Governments 
securities available for collateral to borrowings have been in a two-way 
squeeze. Not only have holdings of Governments declined but also the 
amount of Governments pledged against public funds has increased. As banks 
have been subjected to pressure toward additional borrowing, some individual 
banks have had to scramble to find free Governments to use as collateral.
33
If these trends continue, riior*e banks will find the need to borrov; on 
collateral other than Governments*
Chart 9 summarizes the various lending functions of the Federal Reserve 
that are available to member banks under present law* The Federal Reserve 
makes loans to other financial institutions besides banks who are members 
of the Federal Reserve System but the functions in Cha2*t 9 include only those 
which apply to member banks*
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CHART 9
LENDING FUNCTIONS OF FEDERAL RESERVE BA14KS
(As authorized by regulations' of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System under provisions of the Federal Reserve Act and Defense 
Production Act.)
Maturity
Rederal Reserve Act. Section 13: 
Regulation A
Advances secured ty direct obli­
gation of the United States (Par. 8, 
sec. 13) (covers virtually all 
borrowing)
Same as above except made only in 
unusual or extreme emergencies
Advances secured ty eligible notes, 
drafts, and bills of exchange
Rediscounts of eligible notes, 
drafts, and bills of exchange
fifteen
days
ninety
days
ninety
days
ninety
days
Federal Reserve Act. Section 13a; 
Regulation A
Rediscounts of agricultural paper nine months
Federal Reserve Act. Section 10b:
Advances secured to the satisfaction 
of the Federal Reserve Bank (Interest 
rate is l/2 percent higher than the 
prevailing discount rate.) four months
Source: George W. McKinney, Jr., The Federal Reserve Discount WiWow#
New Brunswick, New Jersey; Rutgers University Press, I960, p. 57•
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Chapter Eight 
CONCLUSIONS
In general the reluctance of member banks to borrow from the Federal 
Reserve has decreased in recent years. Given similar circumstances banks 
will now more readily turn to the Federal Reserve for funds than they would 
have in the decade following the depression of the 30's. We can expect the 
reluctance to borrow to weaken during periods when bank reserves are under 
greater pressure; and if this pressure on reserves is more or less continuing, 
member banks should become more familiar with the borrowing mechanisms and 
more willing to use them. Conversely during continuing periods of little 
pressure on bank reserves banks should become less familiar with borrowing 
and more unwilling to utilize the borrowing facilities of the Federal Reserve.
The implication of this seems to be that during prolonged periods of 
tight money when member banks become familiar with borrowing procedures and 
make more use of the borrowing mechanisms, the Federal Reserve will have to 
resort to direct action on specific member banks to avoid indiscriminate use of 
the borrowing facilities.
Member banks find redis counting less convenient than borrowing on advances. 
One important difference is that an advance is in the amount and maturity 
needed, whereas it may be hard to find an eligible note of precisely the 
right size and maturity to rediscount. It is also easier for the Federal 
Reserve to handle records of advances since they would record one large note 
and list the collateral; whereas with discounting they would have to maintain 
separate records for each note dis coated.
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There appear to be several arguments for abandoning the concept of 
eligibility:
First, the concept was originally developed to accommodate the com­
mercial loan theory of self-liquidating loans.
Second, the limit to any borrowing should be determined by the circum­
stances of the loan and not by the nature of the collateral.
Third, dividing collateral into "eligible" or "ineligible" does not 
mean that it is at the same time necessarily "safe" or "unsafe."
Fourth, bankers having an abundance of Government Securities pay little 
attention to the eligibility of their loans since the securities are much 
more convenient collateral ar̂ yway.
Fifth, most borrowing is on advances and the Federal Reserve looks to 
the bank and not the collateral for payment. Only if the bank fails would 
the collateral be called upon.
Sixth, the income from the l/2 percent penalty rate under Section 10 (b) 
under normal circumstances is negligible. The cost of distinquishing in 
regulation and administration between eligible and ineligible undoubtedly 
exceeds the gross income derived from the penalty rate.
Seventh, banks pay more attention to convenience than to cost vàien 
borrowing.
Eighth, most of the claims that eligibility requirements have led to 
improvement in commercial banking standards are attributable to requirements 
that loans be liquid and sound, that adequate statements be furnished, and 
that customers* paper be subjected to careful review by the Federal Reserve 
Bank. With the exception of liquidity, these are requirements of accept­
ability, not eligibility.
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Ninth, the real reason for allowing discounting is to achieve liquidity 
of the banking system in time of crisis. The concept of eligibility tends to 
limit the extent to which this can be done.
The concept of reliance on commercial paper is no longer thought of as 
the automatic credit regulation device. Nevertheless, banks are glad to make 
a certain amount of sound loans of the self-liquidating type where the need 
exists and they should be encouraged to do so. In practice, however, a bank 
in the United States today cannot and should not limit its credit extensions 
to short-term business loans.
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